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WATER PLANNING:  AN OPPORTUNITY FOR 
MANAGING UNCERTAINTIES AT THE TRIBAL-
STATE INTERFACE? 
STEPHEN H. GREETHAM* 
I. Introduction 
Ten years ago, Donald Rumsfeld offered a semi-poetic1 reminder of 
considerations to keep in mind when tackling any complex task:   
[A]s we know, there are known knowns; there are things we 
know we know.  We also know there are known unknowns; that 
is to say we know there are some things we do not know.  But 
there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we 
don't know.2 
I have always viewed this reminder as workable advice, i.e., before 
setting off on a difficult endeavor, you should take an honest and searching 
inventory of your facts—figure out what you do and don’t know on the 
subject and develop a sense of what is knowable and unknowable, from a 
present perspective.  To offer my own version of it, our efforts do best 
when we stick to what we know while continuing to work toward 
expanding our knowledge and establishing contingencies to deal with the 
inevitable uncertainties. Approaching complex matters in this way keeps 
our efforts reality based and, ultimately, enhances their long-term utility. 
The Rumsfeld reminder seems particularly useful when approaching a 
water plan—either in developing a plan or in reading someone else’s.  This 
paper discusses the water plan task with particular regard for the legal 
“knowns” and “unknowns” at the tribal-state interface.  Water plans 
throughout the West have had to address the tribal-state interface, and it is 
an issue of increasing attention in Oklahoma.  Oklahoma’s water plan has 
included discussions of the issue in each of its iterations, providing a useful 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D., Northeastern University School of Law (1998); Adjunct Professor of Law, 
University of Oklahoma College of Law; Special Counsel for Water and Natural Resources 
to the Chickasaw Nation, an American Indian tribe located within the State of Oklahoma. 
 1. See e.g., Hart Seely, The Poetry of D.H. Rumsfeld, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2003, 1:03 PM ET), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/low_concept/2003/04/the_poetry_of_dh_rumsf
eld.html; Bryant Kong & Elender Wall, The Unknown on THE POETRY OF DONALD RUMSFELD 
(Stuffed Penguin 2004), available at http://stuffedpenguin.com/rumsfeld/documents/TheUn 
knownclip160k_000.mp3.  
 2. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, News Transcript (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www. 
defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
594 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:593 
 
 
set of texts for exploring how the State has addressed the matter.  
California’s water plan also provides a useful example for discussion 
purposes—i.e., a state water plan that goes so far as to build a structural 
adjunct to its administrative infrastructure for purposes of facilitating and 
integrating state-tribal intergovernmental consultation.  Meanwhile, the 
Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations are in the process of developing a tribal-
regional water plan that focuses on the resources, needs, and critical policy 
values of their shared treaty homeland in southeast Oklahoma, which 
exercise will encounter the tribal-state interface.  The relationship of state-
tribal water conflict and water planning is a subject too little considered in 
both the study and practice of water law.  It is my hope that this informal 
discussion makes a relevant and timely contribution to this symposium. 
To that end, this paper is written in three parts.  First, it offers a broad 
summary of tribal water rights, focusing on the essential principles of the 
reserved rights doctrine and outlining the primary means used to establish 
those principles—i.e., litigation and negotiated settlement.  Next, it offers a 
lawyer’s overview of the water planning exercise, a largely science-driven 
policy task that is meant to help us proactively address water resource 
management challenges.  Third, it explores some of the associated legal 
“knowns” and “unknowns” that water planners face at the tribal-state 
interface and concludes with a brief comparative discussion of how the 
Oklahoma and California water plans have addressed uncertainty in that 
zone.  While it is not clear that water planning processes have yet been 
successfully used to facilitate avoidance or preemptive resolution of tribal-
state water uncertainties, it appears that they are a tool that could be more 
actively explored for that purpose. 
II. Tribal Water Rights 
Two systems dominate American water law:  riparianism and prior 
appropriation.  Regardless of their distinct structures, each provides for the 
allocation of water flows and quantities.  Each recognizes a governmental 
role, and both arise from and manifest specific societal values relating to 
economic development, private property rights, and environmental 
protection.  Each system, as it has developed through case law and evolving 
statutes, translates localized concepts of abstract use-value hierarchies—
such as promoting conservation and shortage-sharing or, alternately, 
diversion and consumption—into more or less practical rules on which we 
can base our everyday conduct.  But from the long view, it is apparent that 
these systems are not static; both are constantly subject to some measure of 
strain as our economies, communities, and understanding of our 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/5
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environment adapt and evolve.  Each system, in its own way, wrestles with 
a theme central to water law:  How do we balance the certainty necessary to 
protect private property with the flexibility needed to provide for changing 
conditions that are outside of our control?   
The certainty-flexibility and private-public axes are central to water law, 
and our water rights systems have generally evolved to highlight the 
known-knowns of both the riparian and prior appropriation systems.  For 
water planners, this is good news. But American water law is broader than 
those two legal systems, and one of the richest soils for producing 
“unknowns” in this area has been federal Indian water law, which may not 
be something that water planners greet with any particular joy.  For the past 
century, though, we have been working to better understand what we know 
and do not know on the subject. 
A. What We Know About Tribal Water Rights 
Federal Indian water law formally got its start in 1908 when the Supreme 
Court enjoined non-Indians from interfering with the Milk River as it 
flowed past the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, located in what is now the 
State of Montana.3  A generation prior, the government had reserved lands 
on the river to the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine tribes not as an act of 
charity but in exchange for massive tribal land cessions—a transaction that 
was part of the government’s opening of the West to non-Indian settlement 
as tribal peoples were forced into more expressly agrarian lifestyles and 
economies within smaller, bounded land holdings.4  One year after 
Congress approved the Fort Belknap transaction, it welcomed Montana into 
the Union as a new state, ushering in settlements that placed greater 
demands on the Milk River upstream from the tribes’ lands.5  Concerned 
for the success of the reservation enterprise, the government brought suit 
asserting, on behalf of the tribes, a broad right to the Milk River.6  In its 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 574-78 (1908). 
 4. Id. at 567-68, 576 (discussing treaty purpose of shifting tribes from nomadic to 
pastoral lifestyle).  See generally THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER 
RIGHTS:  THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL 22-24 (Barbara Cosens & Judith V. Royster eds., 2012) 
(providing summary discussion of historic context of Winters litigation, including the federal 
actions and local pressures that led to the establishment of the Fort Belknap Reservation). 
 5. See generally THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS:  THE 
WINTERS CENTENNIAL, supra note 4, at 22-24. 
 6. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565-67.  See generally THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL 
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS:  THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL, supra note 4, at 26-29 (summarizing 
the United States’ “three mutually reinforcing theories as to why these water rights are 
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ruling, the Court built on the parties’ arguments and provided the 
foundation for a new theory of water rights:  the doctrine of federal reserved 
rights.7 
Today, Winters stands for the rule that a federal reservation of lands from 
the public domain will be presumed to include waters adequate for 
accomplishing the purposes of the reservation.8  Notwithstanding the 
Winters treaty’s silence on the question of water rights, the Court reasoned:  
[I]t would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress 
destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the 
consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren waste—took 
from them the means of continuing their old habits, yet did not 
leave them the power to change to new ones.9 
In one of its more famous passages, the Court elaborated: 
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters—
command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, 
“and grazing roving herds of stock,” or turned to agriculture and 
the arts of civilization.  Did they give up all this? Did they 
                                                                                                                 
available for the tribes,” i.e., reservation of rights under general principles, reservation of 
rights as the tribes would have understood them, and riparian rights under state law). 
 7. Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-77. For an authoritative analysis of the Court’s Winters 
decision, see generally JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS:  THE WINTERS 
DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 150-57 (2000); see also THE FUTURE OF 
INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS:  THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL, supra note 4, 
at 54-65 (featuring Shurts’ summary of his placement of the Winters case within the broader 
water and federal Indian law context). 
 8. Although Winters, for better or worse, has become virtually synonymous with 
“tribal water rights” in the public’s understanding, it was actually a ruling three years earlier 
that provided the seed from which grew the “reserved rights” doctrine of federal Indian 
water law.  See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).  In Winans, the Court held 
that a Yakima Nation treaty with the United States vested tribal citizens with the continuing 
right to set up fishing weirs in traditional locations notwithstanding the fact that title to such 
places had since passed, via allotment and federal conveyance, to non-Indians who were 
using such locations for fishing practices that were incompatible with what the tribal citizens 
pursued.  Id. at 379, 381. Faced with a stark contrast in values—the rights of after-acquiring 
title holders versus the aboriginal practices of a treaty tribe’s citizens—the Court turned to 
the relevant treaty and held that such a document memorialized a profound transaction and 
was, importantly, a grant of rights from the tribe to the federal government.  Id. at 381. 
Thus, by implication, that which the tribe did not expressly grant to the government was 
reserved to the tribe.  Id.  Winans and Winters reservations are accordingly distinct though, 
as the case law has evolved, closely related.  
 9. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. 
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reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters which 
made it valuable or adequate?10 
The Court did not ask those questions rhetorically; its questions were key 
to the issue presented:  Were the tribes entitled to flows of the Milk River 
sufficient to enjoin the subject diversions and impoundments?  The Court’s 
unambiguous answer?  Yes. 
Winters is striking for several reasons, not least of which is that it was 
decided during a particularly dark period of federal Indian law and policy—
a period in which the courts consistently closed their doors to tribal 
complaints as tribal peoples and cultures were shoved aside to make way 
for non-tribal expansion into tribal homelands.11 Since its issuance in 1908, 
Winters has grown—both symbolically and practically—as a defensive 
beachhead from which efforts to protect tribal self-determination, 
homelands, and resources have been staged. Notwithstanding the broader 
array of social forces facing tribal continuance at that time, the Winters 
Court affirmed that the federal-tribal intergovernmental transactions on 
which the American West was founded would mean something in the law. 
But mean what, exactly?  Historical context aside, Winters is still 
striking for the number of questions it does not answer.  For example, what 
was the nature and extent of the tribes’ water right?  Nothing was quantified 
or otherwise defined, nor did the Court seem at all concerned about it.  Nor 
did the Court seem concerned with questions such as how one would 
administer a federal-law reserved right among growing state-law 
appropriations from the same water source or who would referee the actual 
day-to-day balancing acts that water rights administration would require.  
While not addressed by the Court, those questions (and many others) have 
been litigated as Winters and its progeny evolved into the body of federal 
Indian water law that we have today.   
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
 11. The apex of this “dark period” is perhaps Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 
(1903), wherein the Court concluded that allegations of federal treaty violations that posed 
an existential threat to tribal peoples raised only political questions that lay outside the 
judiciary’s reach.  See generally DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN 
GROUND:  AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 110-13 (2001) (discussing 
Lone Wolf in its jurisprudential and historic context); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:  THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 64-117 (1997) 
(discussing key cases from this period); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, 
AND THE LAW 23-26 (1987) (same). 
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That body of federal common law gives us a reasonable outline of what 
tribal water rights mean on the ground.  For example, we can confidently 
say the following: 
Tribal water rights include both sovereign (i.e., regulatory) and 
proprietary (i.e., ownership) elements;12 
Tribal water rights are created, defined, and governed by federal law, not 
state law;13 
Tribal water rights are of a nature and extent sufficient to fulfill the 
federal purposes for which they were implicitly established;14 
Tribal water rights generally vest prior to those held under state law 
water right systems, thus giving them a valuable seniority within 
appropriative systems;15 and 
                                                                                                                 
 12. E.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §19.04[2] (Nell Jessup Newton 
et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (noting that tribal water rights “are 
property rights held by tribes and their members” but further noting that “Indian tribes, 
therefore, have full and exclusive regulatory authority over Indian reserved rights to water, 
including water rights of allottees and lessees”); cf. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 
415, 423 n.12 (1996) (characterizing tribal water rights as “an element of tribal 
sovereignty”).  But cf. THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS:  THE 
WINTERS CENTENNIAL, supra note 4, at 89 (lamenting that “American water law has come to 
treat tribes like mere individual owners of water rights and less like sovereigns with the 
authority and power to govern those water rights within their own territories”). 
 13. E.g., COHEN, supra note 12, §19.03[1] (“First and foremost, the cases established 
that Indian reserved rights to water are determined by federal, not state law. Indian rights 
and interests in property are defined and protected by federal law, and state jurisdiction over 
Indian property interests within Indian country is preempted unless authorized by Congress.” 
(Footnotes omitted.)); see also, e.g., New Mexico ex rel, State Engineer v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 
1102-11 (10th Cir. 1976) (“Any intent of Congress to relinquish its jurisdiction and control 
over the lands and water rights of the Pueblos must be express,” and there was no showing 
that the United States had so “relinquished jurisdiction and control over the Pueblos” or 
“placed their water rights under New Mexico law.”). 
 14. E.g., COHEN, supra note 12, §19.03[4] (“Tribal water rights are reserved to carry out 
the purposes for which particular reservations were established.”); Judith Royster, Winters in 
the East:  Tribal Reserved Rights to Water in Riparian States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 169, 174 (2000) (“The first fundamental principle of tribal reserved water rights 
is that when Indian country is established, that act implicitly reserves for the use of the tribe 
that amount of water which is needed to fulfill the purposes for which the land was set 
aside.”); cf. also United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1997) (focusing analysis of 
reserved right on the United States’ operable intent). 
 15. E.g., COHEN, supra note 12, at §19.03[3] (discussing establishment of reserved right 
priorities for purposes of implementing tribal water rights within state-law appropriative 
systems); cf. also Royster, supra note 14, at 179-82 (discussing “paramount” nature of 
reserved tribal water rights). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/5
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Tribal water rights do not require placement to beneficial use for 
purposes of perfecting them and cannot be lost through non-use, thus giving 
them a certain riparian gloss.16 
Perhaps the most important thing we can say regarding what we know 
about tribal water rights, at least for the purposes of this paper, is that those 
rights remain largely undefined in most systems, and they thus give rise to 
questions for which we don’t yet have answers.17  Those unanswered 
questions—the known-unknowns—are most relevant where tribal and state-
law water rights come into contact with each other, i.e., at the tribal-state 
interface, at which point they can affect water resource use and associated 
management initiatives, something of practical concern to water regulators 
and users. 
Oklahoma recently had an up-close-and-personal encounter with those 
known-unknowns.  In 2005, the Oklahoma Attorney General commenced a 
federal court action against poultry integrators, alleging that their land 
application of chicken litter (or fecal waste) within the Illinois River 
watershed was degrading that river’s water quality in violation of federal 
                                                                                                                 
 16. E.g., Royster, supra note 14, at 183 (“[T]ribal reserved rights to water are not 
forfeited or abandoned by non-use.”); cf. COHEN, supra note 12, §19.03[3] (noting that tribal 
rights “are often put to actual use long after appropriation rights are established”). 
 17. I intentionally use the word “undefined” rather than “unquantified.”  Quantification 
is a function and necessity of appropriative water right systems only.  As Professor Judith 
Royster teaches, the quantification of tribal water rights is attributable more to efforts to 
harmonize administration of tribal water rights within prior appropriation legal systems than 
to anything inherent to the nature of a tribal water right itself.  See Royster, supra note 14, at 
173.  Furthermore, even within the traditional Winters/appropriation-jurisdiction context, 
what “quantification” requires has not been static.  Compare Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546, 600-01 (1963) (announcing “practically irrigable acreage” standard), with In re Gen. 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 79-81 
(Ariz. 2001) (announcing “homeland” standard).  Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that the 
non-Winters water right claims of the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico have generally and 
variously been in litigation since 1966, federal law has yet to produce a concrete standard for 
“quantifying” Pueblo water rights.  Compare New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt 
(Aamodt II), 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985) (announcing “historically irrigable 
acreage” standard), with United States v. Abousleman, Civ. No. 83-1041 at 21-28 (D.N.M. 
Oct. 4, 2004) (declining to accept the Aamodt standard as controlling).  It is an open question 
as to whether the definition of tribal water rights within riparian jurisdictions, for example, 
would give rise to quantification issues; indeed, as in all matters associated with a federal 
reserved right, the overarching requirement is to define the right in accord with the manifest 
federal purpose, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1997) (focusing analysis of 
reserved right on the United States’ operable intent)—an analysis that may not require 
quantification. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
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law.18  In addition to injunctive relief, the action sought natural resource 
damages and other money claims.19  The defendants argued, however, that 
the real-party-in-interest with respect to those damages claims was not 
present and could not be forced to join the proceedings.20  The missing 
party?  The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, which, the defendants argued, 
held relevant rights to the subject water resources pursuant to its removal-
era treaties with the federal government.21  The court agreed and, pursuant 
to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the damages 
component of Oklahoma’s suit.22 
The Tyson case raises two points.  First, those unanswered questions are 
a very real part of our legal landscape and can have a very real impact on 
water resource management. Regardless of what one thinks of the scientific 
or legal merit of the Tyson suit, the court’s indispensible party ruling 
illustrates that unanswered questions about the respective scopes of tribal 
and state legal interests in water resources can derail complex efforts to 
manage and protect those water resources.  Second, Tyson shows that this is 
not a “problem” created by tribes or tribal advocates; it is instead a 
concrete part of our shared legal landscape, something left to us by our 
shared history.  The Cherokee Nation did not make the arguments that 
required the dismissal of Oklahoma’s damages claims; Tyson and its co-
defendants did.  In fact, the tribe tried to work with Oklahoma toward a 
commonly held goal, Illinois River watershed restoration, but that effort at 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 05-329 (N.D. Okla., Jun. 13, 2005). 
 19. See generally Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 05-329 (N.D. Ok., Jul. 16, 
2007) (Second Amended Complaint); id. ¶¶ 69-76 (Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) cost recovery claim); id. ¶¶ 77-88 
(CERCLA natural resource damages claim); id. ¶¶ 89-96 (Solid Waste Disposal Act 
(SWDA) claim, seeking injunction and abatement); id. ¶¶ 97-107 (state law nuisance claim, 
seeking injunctive relief as well as compensation, reimbursement, and exemplary and 
punitive damages, as well as court costs and reasonable attorney fees); id. ¶¶ 108-117 
(federal law nuisance claim, seeking injunctive relief as well as compensation, 
reimbursement, and exemplary and punitive damages); id. ¶¶ 118-126 (trespass claim, 
seeking injunctive relief as well as compensation, reimbursement, and exemplary and 
punitive damages); id. ¶¶ 127-138 (various state statutory claims, seeking injunctive relief as 
well as civil penalties, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees); id. ¶¶ 139-146 (claims for 
unjust enrichment, restitution, and disgorgement). 
 20. See generally Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 05-329 (N.D. Ok., Oct. 31, 
2008) (Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join the Cherokee Nation as an [sic] 
Required Party or, in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Based on 
Lack of Standing). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 472, 481-83 (N.D. Okla. 2009). 
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tribal-state cooperation—on the facts of that case and as presented in that 
courtroom, at least—was unsuccessful.23 
Tyson highlights the contours of some of our unanswered questions—the 
Rumsfeldian known-unknowns.  Those questions rise from history and 
circumstance to present us with a specific decision point:  Do we ignore 
them and wait for their uncertainties to ripen into actual conflict?  Do we 
engage and seek to resolve them?  Or, do we game them for purposes of 
some short-term objective?  If we choose to address the law’s presently 
unanswered questions, we generally have two options:  litigate or negotiate.  
Federal Indian water law is no exception. 
B. Addressing the Unanswered Questions 
The first wave approach to answering post-Winters questions was 
litigation.24  More specifically, it was litigation arising within appropriation 
doctrine jurisdictions and typically in the form of general stream 
adjudications on over-appropriated stream systems.25  Those general stream 
adjudications are the grand-daddies of western water law, complex and 
                                                                                                                 
 23. As the Attorney General for Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma Diane Hammons framed 
the issue, “[t]he question is not who owns the water; the question is who owns the 
pollution,” and both the State and the Nation agreed that the companies owned that problem.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, lines 20-21, Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 
05-329 (N.D. Okla. Sep. 15, 2009).  As part of the cooperative effort, the State and Nation 
entered an agreement under which Oklahoma recognized the Cherokee Nation’s substantial 
interests in the Illinois River and the Cherokee Nation authorized Oklahoma to act to protect 
those interests.  See Agreement Between the State of Oklahoma and the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma (May 19, 2009) (on file with author). However, the court held that agreement was 
insufficient for purposes of saving the State’s damages claims.  Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 
F.R.D. at 475-76 (assessing Oklahoma-Cherokee Nation agreement and concluding that it 
“is invalid [under state law] and does not resolve or moot the Rule 19 issues raised in 
defendants’ motion”).  Likewise, the court also denied as untimely a Cherokee Nation 
motion to intervene, see Tyson Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 05-329 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 18, 2009) 
(Order), aff’d, 619 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2010), thus bringing this component of Oklahoma’s 
case to an end.  
 24. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1962); In re Gen. Adjudication of All 
Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001); In re Gen. 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn I), 753 P.2d 
76 (Wyo. 1988).  Each of these rulings arose from complex western water rights disputes—
the first from an original jurisdiction proceeding before the Supreme Court and the second 
and third from state court general stream adjudications conducted pursuant to state law and 
the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1952).  
 25. See, e.g., Royster, supra note 14, at 183-84. 
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sprawling legal actions that take generations to complete.26  Our experience 
with the litigation approach has demonstrated a few basic truths—namely, 
courts can define co-relative rights in a shared resource and can even give 
us a decree we can use for future water rights administration.  At the same 
time, courts—by design—are of limited use when it comes to resolving 
intercommunity or political struggles.  To oversimplify, litigation helped 
answer questions but failed to resolve conflicts.27  Tribal water fights tend 
to involve cultural differences that turn, at least in part, on starkly differing 
views of control, history, and identity.  Furthermore, tribal water fights 
often turn on questions of what the future will, or should, look like as it 
relates to water resources.  These issues can divide communities and launch 
political conflicts that courts and associated administrative processes are 
not capable of resolving.  
The federal government—cognizant of litigation’s limitations—launched 
a second wave approach to post-Winters questions in the 1970s when it 
began encouraging the negotiated settlement of tribal water rights disputes.  
More specifically, the United States began to encourage negotiated 
settlement of active tribal water rights litigation, whenever such resolution 
was possible.  Congress approved the first tribal water settlement in 1978,28 
a full seven decades after the Winters decision; twelve years later, the 
Departments of Interior and Justice, working with the White House Office 
of Management and Budget, established the formal criteria and procedures 
that govern federal participation in tribal water negotiations.29  To date, 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Not too long ago, New Mexico State Engineer John D’Antonio indicated it would 
take upwards of “another 600 years to complete the adjudication of water rights” in that 
state. Lora Lucero & A. Dan Tarlock, Water Supply and Urban Growth in New Mexico:  
Same Old, Same Old or a New Era?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803, 819 (2003). 
 27. Professor Dan McCool has noted that repeated tribal court victories aside, political 
realities have often made it “nearly impossible to stop these upstream water users from 
diverting rivers and streams that originally flowed through or past Indian reservations.  Thus 
many of the court victories had a hollow ring to them.  However, the constant threat of 
lawsuits kept many non-Indian water users apprehensive.  After seventy years of 
acrimonious litigation, both sides began looking for an alternative to endless court battles.”  
Daniel McCool, Indian Water Settlements:  Negotiating Tribal Claims to Water, 107 J. 
CONTEMP. WATER RESOURCES & EDUC. 28, 28 (1997). 
 28. Ak-Chin Indian Community Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409.  
 29. Notice, Department of the Interior Working Group in Indian Water Settlements; 
Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations for 
the Settlement of Indian Water Right Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990).  The 
Obama Administration has generally re-committed to the 1990 criteria and procedures and to 
“work with Congress to identify and implement clear criteria for going forward with future 
settlements on issues including cost-sharing and eligible costs.”  Letty Belin, The 
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Congress has approved twenty-nine tribal water right settlements,30 and the 
Department of the Interior has approximately a dozen negotiation teams in 
the field working toward future settlements. 
In recent years, scholars of law and the social sciences have sought to 
learn from prior successes and failures by evaluating tribal settlements and 
the efficacy of the federal process.31  The track record is mixed, but 
ultimately suggests that, at their best, negotiated settlements can obtain 
answers for the parties, as in the litigation context, while also providing for 
localized problem solving that supports the respectful resolution of complex 
intercommunity conflict.32 Mindful of its pros and cons, Professor Daniel 
McCool places this second wave approach in historical context; 
underscoring the negotiated resolution of tribal water rights conflicts in 
terms of tribal existence, continuance, and self-determination: 
Ultimately, the settlements are much more than just water 
settlements; they are, in a larger sense, sovereignty settlements 
because they decide issues of control and destiny.  They involve 
water marketing, land acquisition and use, administrative 
control, and culturally sensitive water uses.  And in nearly every 
settlement, the tribes must relinquish their right to future claims 
to reserved water rights—forever.  Thus, the settlement era is, in 
effect, a second treaty-making era.  The first treaty-making era 
was concerned with land; this one involves water.  If 
                                                                                                                 
Administration’s Settlement Policy (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.narf.org/water/ 
2011/presentations/06-belin.pdf.  
 30. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND & W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, SETTLEMENTS APPROVED 
BY CONGRESS (updated Aug. 2011) (on file with author). 
 31. See e.g., BONNIE COLBY ET AL., NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS:  FULFILLING 
PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST (2005); DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS:  CONTEMPORARY 
INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2006); TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS:  
ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS (John E. Thorson et al. eds., 
2006). 
 32. While I will paraphrase his words, a more experienced hand than myself—Lee 
Wilson, a New Mexico-based hydrologist—once put it to me that while litigation can get 
you a decree of your rights, negotiation can get you the “three Rs”:  Your rights, better 
relations with your neighbors, and the possibility of resources for actual water management 
and development.  For a limited but useful empirical analysis of negotiated tribal water 
settlements, see generally Daniel McCool, Intergovernmental Conflict and Indian Water 
Rights:  An Assessment of Negotiated Settlements, 23 PUBLIUS 85 (1993) (evaluating six 
claimed advantages of negotiation over litigation based on an analysis of contemporaneously 
completed tribal water right settlements); see also LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN 
WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW (1991). 
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reservations are going to serve as viable homelands, they must 
have both.33 
Such a comprehensive and explicitly forward looking approach goes far 
beyond the mere question-answering capacity of litigation and moves us 
closer to the realm of water planning. 
III. Water Planning 
Water planning is a science-based policy exercise designed to improve 
our capabilities to deal with future demands.  Like other substantive law 
subjects that tie to the environment, water law tends to keep close company 
with science and scientists, and whether the subject is climate change, 
population growth, or legal uncertainties at the tribal-state interface, water 
planning can create an opportunity for lawyers, scientists, and policy 
makers to work together proactively and in a non-adversarial context.  
Since water planning is typically a non-legal tool produced by a single 
government, it can neither authoritatively answer the legal questions nor 
actually resolve the issues we face.  It can, however, serve to facilitate our 
exploration of those questions and provide an opportunity for better 
understanding what threatens to divide or challenge communities before 
those challenges ripen into actual conflict.34 As such, I tend to think of 
water plans as the not-too-distant cousins of the litigation and negotiation 
processes that have defined the first and second wave approach to post-
Winters questions, though perhaps too seldom considered in that relation. 
A. Why Do Governments Create Water Plans? 
The governmental role in water law is critical.  Governments are not 
typically proprietors of water rights;35 instead, they generally function as 
regulators.  They are responsible for administering the legal systems in 
which proprietary interests are exercised—establishing and refereeing 
property interests within their respective jurisdictions, including such 
interests in water.  Governments also typically provide for the construction, 
operation, and management of our water delivery infrastructure—the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. McCool, supra note 27, at 31. 
 34. Plainly, water planning could still be a useful tool for exploring approaches to 
resolution even after an uncertainty has ripened into conflict; however, such exercises would 
likely be more in the context of a second-wave negotiation rather than a pure water planning 
exercise. 
 35. See e.g., Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 545 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(citing Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 950-52 (1982)). 
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reservoirs and pipes that alter our natural environment and facilitate the 
growth of communities and economies.  Unlike other natural resources, our 
communities and economies cannot exist without water, and our 
governments—federal, tribal, and state—therefore have a unique interest in, 
and responsibility for, its security. 
In this light, the development of a water plan should be understood as a 
governmental effort to get ahead of the proverbial curve.  Properly done, a 
water plan provides an opportunity to understand better the resource and 
prepare for the future.  With that in mind, governments engage in water 
planning to: 
(1) improve our shared understanding of the competing demands placed 
on the resource as well as the fiscal and legal parameters in which those 
demands materialize; 
(2) prompt high-level policy discussions of water management issues 
and priorities; and 
(3) based on that improved understanding and assessment of priorities, 
establish a policy vision for allocating financial and physical resources 
while protecting jurisdictional and/or regional interests. 
For better or worse, though, water planners receive little recognition for 
their work, despite its critical nature.  Why?  Talking about history can be 
grounds enough for division and conflict, but talking about what we want 
from the future can be even more so.  After all, in talking about the future, 
what future do we have in mind?  Whose view of the future?  Whose view is 
going to win, and whose is going to lose?  Whether or not the questions are 
framed as starkly as that, the reality of tensions that inhere to the certainty-
flexibility and private-public axes can quickly make planning exercises the 
lightning rods for competing political agendas,36 which can distract from, 
and even compromise the integrity of, the planning effort.37 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Take, for example, Oklahoma’s most recent update to its water plan, an effort that 
has been alternatively criticized as imposing artificial water shortages that will hamstring 
industry and urban growth while simultaneously drying rural Oklahoma so that it will be 
easier to “sell” water to Texas.  E.g., compare Memorandum, Joint Position on the OWRB 
Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://www.okstate 
chamber.com/additional/legcorrespondence/2012/OKCompWaterPlan2_8_12.pdf, with Joe 
Wertz, State Water Plan’s Cost is Questioned, Science Criticized, NPR (Nov. 3, 2011, 10:27 
AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2011/11/03/state-water-plans-cost-is-questioned-
science-criticized/.  
 37. See e.g., Arnold Hamilton, Hands Across the Water—The Wheeling and Dealing of 
Water Rights Takes a Deft Wrist, URB. TULSA WKLY. (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.urban 
tulsa.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A46960 (“State leaders did the smart thing, ordering 
up a comprehensive statewide water plan that was designed to give policy-makers the 
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Given the pressures that can come to bear on water planning efforts, the 
question “Why do governments do water plans?” might be read more 
cynically than I have intended.  At the end of the day, though, two facts 
remain.  First, water is simply controversial.38  Perhaps we all have too 
much at stake for it not to be so.  Whether it is water litigation or water 
negotiation, water issues raise passions, and that may be particularly true 
when it comes to tribal-state water issues.  As former New Mexico 
Representative (and then-future Governor) Bill Richardson once said from 
the floor of Congress, “[t]here is no more divisive issue in the West than the 
dispute between Indians and non-Indians over water.”39  Be that as it may, 
we still have our second fact—namely, all things considered, a sound water 
planning process provides governments with perhaps the most flexible and 
fact-based format for exploring relevant scientific findings and legal 
principles.  In that light, water planning processes could be useful for trying 
to develop pre-conflict consensus among affected water users.40  
Litigation has its limits, as does negotiation, and water planning is no 
different.  But these are all tools for addressing the complex (and 
sometimes confounding) issues that water law, policy, and our day-to-day 
needs present. 
B. What Makes Up a Water Plan? 
As a practical matter, water plans rest on complex science-based reviews 
of four general elements:   
 (1) an assessment of available water supplies; 
(2) an assessment of water demands, both present and projected future; 
(3) an analysis of whether supplies are adequate to meet demands; and  
                                                                                                                 
information necessary to determine what's in the state's best long-term interests.  
Unfortunately, the $16 million analysis was a dud, victimized by back-room special interest 
gamesmanship that overrode science and common purpose.”).  
 38. The two prior footnotes notwithstanding, it should be emphasized that these 
competing political agendas and controversies are not unique to Oklahoma.  See, e.g., Glenn 
Evans, State Water Plan Includes Building Controversial Northeast Texas Reservoir, NEWS-
JOURNAL.COM (Dec. 21, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.news-journal.com/news/local/state-
water-plan-includes-building-controversial-northeast-texas-reservoir/article_731a9348-831 
7-5c29-b4a7-c70eac5b7b7a.html; Will Goldsmith, Water Plan ‘Architect’ Reflects on 
Controversy, C-VILLE – CHARLOTTESVILLE NEWS & ARTS (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.c-ville. 
com/index.php?cat=141404064435450&ShowArticle_ID=11801201093860282; Mark A. 
Stein, Water Plan Controversy:  It’s Off to an Early Start, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 1988), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-12-21/news/mn-669_1_water-board. 
 39. 100 CONG. REC. 9,348 (1988).  
 40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/5
2012] WATER PLANNING:  AN OPPORTUNITY 607 
 
 
(4) an identification and assessment of options for marrying up those 
supplies and demands in the real world. 
Whether one focuses on questions of fact, technological capability, 
economic feasibility, political will, or law, each element presents its own 
maze of known-knowns, known-unknowns, and unknown-unknowns—thus 
providing an opportunity for taking stock of our Rumsfeldian knowledge 
inventory and aiming for someplace ahead of the curve. 
For example, let’s assume the role of a generic planner who is setting out 
on a new water plan effort.  At the outset, she is asked to consider whether 
climate change projections indicate a future impact on supply and demand 
projections.  After taking an inventory of the science available to her, she 
would—to grossly oversimplify—have three potential views on the subject:  
Yes, no, and I don’t know.  Whatever her view, its expression will 
necessarily impact the water plan.  If her view is “yes,” then the next set of 
questions she must confront will turn on an assessment of how such impacts 
might affect the resource.  Will it decrease supplies?  Increase them?  What 
about demands?  What about timing of supply availability and demand 
peaks? Conversely, if her view is “no,” then the factor is dust-binned, 
stricken from further consideration.  If her view is “I don’t know,” the next 
step may be to develop contingencies for dealing with a potential range of 
future events—both the known and potentially unknown-unknown 
contingencies.  This sort of exercise is conducted multiple times with 
respect to every variable relevant to our planner’s water plan—including 
legal variables. 
Now, a water plan is not a legal exercise, of course. Its primary purpose 
is to outline the achievable, generally using the language of science and 
quantifiable fact.  Nevertheless, planners are bound as much by the law as 
they are bound by what they can ascertain of the facts on the ground.  For 
example, if our planner works in a prior appropriation jurisdiction, the 
planning work would presumably be governed by the legal principles of 
that water law system.  After all, it would serve no clear purpose for our 
planner to make her supply and demand assessments based on the 
principles of riparianism.  Similarly, if she works in a jurisdiction that 
declares its policy is not sustainable flow management but, instead, the 
maximal utilization of available water resources, it would follow that her 
work should be informed and bounded by those policies. Not to do so 
would be to fail to build a tool up to the task for which it is intended. 
In all of this, our planner is setting the boundaries that will define her 
work.  If she is to engage in a meaningful planning process, she will need to 
take stock of what she knows, does not know, and cannot now know—as to 
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both the water resource itself and the rules that control our use of it.  If she 
fails to make such preparations, she will quickly get lost in the wilderness 
of possibilities and the plan itself will fail to have any grounding in the 
practical day-to-day.  Likewise, when we approach a completed water plan, 
we ought to be able to understand the bounds within which the planner 
worked—whether or not those boundaries are plainly stated.  Clarity as to 
those boundaries will help us understand the uncertainties faced and 
addressed (or not) and will ultimately make the work more relevant to 
ongoing efforts to resolve disputes—including, potentially, proactive efforts 
to avoid conflicts or defuse emerging ones. 
IV. Water Planning Uncertainties and the Tribal-State Interface 
As previously stated, federal Indian water law is perhaps the richest soil 
in American water law for producing legal “unknowns.”  Just as those 
“unknowns” continue to present lawyers and policy makers with points of 
decision (as in the Tyson matter), they also present water planners with a 
series of choices. 
For example, consider the exercise of estimating available water 
supplies.  You will recall that our generic planner (who was earlier dealing 
with climate change science) was employed to conduct a water plan within 
a prior appropriation jurisdiction.  Now assume that she is employed by a 
state water agency to build her plan and that she is asked to focus first on a 
determination of available surface water supplies.  From a scientific and 
fact perspective, she will want to determine which stream basins are within 
the planning parameters, what the data shows with respect to annual and, 
perhaps, monthly or seasonal stream flows.  She may then attempt to 
characterize the various supplies based on an assessment of available water 
quality data.  Based on this body of fact, she will then be able determine 
how much water can be expected to be in which stream, possibly even 
including the time of year during which it is most readily available.  She 
can also make determinations as to the locations of the cleanest water.  
Nevertheless, even after all of this work, she is only able to tell us what 
water is physically available.  Taking her analysis further, she can take an 
inventory of existing water-use permits and determine the quantity and flow 
of water that is subject to existing permitted rights.  It is here that she is 
starting to get into legal availability. 
At the tribal-state interface, assessing legal availability can be a much 
more complicated question than reviewing existing water-use permits.  If 
those waters are subject to identified-yet-undefined tribal rights, no state-
law permit system will be adequate for determining what is legally 
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available for future development.  On the one hand, our planner works for a 
state agency and may therefore be charged to focus only on water available 
presuming the exclusivity of the state’s permitting system.  That is not an 
illegitimate charge; in fact, it would be quite understandable given all of the 
unknowns as to how that identified-but-undefined tribal right might 
someday be defined.41 All the same, the decision would impose a legal 
boundary condition relevant to the completed water plan’s future utility—
rendering her core supply analyses limited and open to question.  
Issues like this come up frequently for water planners working at the 
tribal-state interface, and not solely with respect to assessments of available 
supplies.  Other questions abound.  For example, what uses (or types of 
demands) are legally protected?  Answering that question will develop a 
more refined understanding of demands, particularly if the undefined tribal 
right has a non-consumptive use component in an otherwise predominantly 
prior appropriation system.  Who will control the definition of policies 
relevant to the use and/or movement of water?  If there is a stark divide 
between relevant state and tribal water-use policies—e.g., sustainable 
versus maximal development or regional protectionism versus export and 
marketing—the question of control will have procedural implications 
relevant to how feasible any water plan might be.  For purposes of our 
general discussion, though, there is only one overarching question:  How 
will the water planner handle boundary condition uncertainties that relate 
to “unknowns” at the tribal-state interface? 
Oklahoma’s water plan history provides examples of how those 
uncertainties can be handled, both procedurally and substantively.  For 
instance, in the first iteration of its water plan, released in 1975, the 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (“Board”) concluded that state law 
controlled exclusively, without regard for any possible tribal claims: 
The overall objective of the Plan is the maximum utilization of 
the State’s water resources for all citizens.  Because State law 
notes that all stream water originating in or flowing through the 
State, within limits of interstate compacts, is the property of the 
State of Oklahoma, tribes must file for water rights.  Equal care 
is taken to insure that these water rights are protected. 
 Stream and ground water rights currently held by various 
tribes were given full consideration in the formulation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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Plan to insure this protection, and water needs for present and 
long-range tribal development have also been considered.42 
The Board’s approach did not vary much five years later, with the release 
of the plan’s 1980 iteration.  Though it now recognized Winters, it did so 
grudgingly—and ultimately returned to its 1975 position: 
In regard to Indian water rights, the State of Oklahoma 
recognizes the Winters Doctrine derived from the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling in Winters vs. the United States (1908), which 
doctrine maintains that water rights may be attached to Indian 
reservations created by lawful means, i.e., treaties, acts of 
Congress or executive orders.  However, it should be noted that 
no Indian reservations presently exist in Oklahoma, with those 
previously existing being substantially dissolved by allotment of 
lands in severalty during the period of time from 1891 through 
1906. 
 The future water needs of Oklahoma’s substantial Indian 
population have been considered within the water requirement 
projections included in the Oklahoma Comprehensive Water 
Plan.43 
The approach manifest in Oklahoma’s 1975 and 1980 water plans is 
plain:  It asserts an express boundary condition, i.e., tribal water rights are 
not an issue to be assessed, and proceeds to make its plan based on a 
presumption of state law predominance and state government authority to 
plan for tribes and tribal populations.  I tend to view this sort of approach as 
a wasted opportunity—a use of the planning exercise for advocacy purposes 
only, something that may make conflict more likely, not less. 
The next iteration of Oklahoma’s state water plan, however, traveled a 
great distance.  With its 1997 iteration of the plan, the Board stated:  
Indian water rights in Oklahoma concern both fundamental 
sovereignty and water quantity and quality.  Indian claims to 
water rights could have a significant effect on existing state 
                                                                                                                 
 42. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., PHASE 1 – OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN at 
summary 7-8 (1975). 
 43. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN 11 (1980). 
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water law as well as the current system of water rights 
administration and water quality regulation in Oklahoma.44  
Furthermore, the Board updated its plan to incorporate not only a broader 
discussion of Winters but also to address the non-Winters claims asserted 
by the Five Tribes.45  Finally, in its narrative section and its specific 
itemization of policy priorities, the Board recommended proactive state 
engagement with tribal governments aimed at “develop[ing] a level of 
trust” for purposes of addressing and resolving “the Indian water rights 
issue in a non-confrontational manner . . . .”46 
In its most recent iteration of its water plan, the Board appears to have 
again travelled some distance.  For example, it both expands its discussion 
of tribal water rights—Winters and non-Winters, even going so far as 
acknowledging that federal law may “tend to favor the tribal position.”47  
Moreover, it incorporates a specific issue report on “Tribal Issues and 
Concerns,”48 based on which the Board calls for the Oklahoma Governor 
and Legislature to establish formal protocols for state-tribal consultation.49  
Finally, turning to calculations of “[e]xcess and surplus water” available for 
transbasin movement, the Board pledges the quasi-substantive steps of 
establishing an “in-basin reserve amount” and pledging to exclude from its 
calculations “the quantity of water adjudicated or agreed by cooperative 
agreement or compact to be reserved for Federal or Tribal rights . . . .”50 
The procedural and quasi-substantive shift that can be measured as 
between, on the one hand, Oklahoma’s 1975 and 1980 water plans and, on 
the other, its 1997 and 2012 water plans marks a change from a use of the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., UPDATE OF THE OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN 
1995, at 119 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 PLAN UPDATE].  
 45. Id.; see, e.g., Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 472, 478-79 (N.D. Okla. 
2009).  See generally Stephen H. Greetham, Water Policy in the Former Indian Territory:  
Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Oklahoma at a Crossroads over Sardis Reservoir, WATER REP., 
Dec. 2010, at 1.  
 46. 1997 PLAN UPDATE, supra note 44, at 119; see also id. at 138 (recommending, inter 
alia, the request for the formation of a state-tribal group “to explore Indian water rights and 
quality issues in Oklahoma” and “identify water resource projects warranting cooperative 
action”). 
 47. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN EXECUTIVE 
REPORT 36 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 EXECUTIVE REPORT]. 
 48. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORT – TRIBAL WATER ISSUES & RECOMMENDATIONS (2011), available at http://www. 
owrb.ok.gov/supply/ocwp/ocwp.php.   
 49. 2012 EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 47, at 13. 
 50. Id. at 11. 
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water planning exercise as a defensive advocacy tool to a use of it as a 
potential dispute-avoidance tool.  Leaving aside any assessment of the 
practical impact of the most recent approach, the shift illustrates the 
potential for the use of water plans as proactive dispute avoidance-tools, 
used for the consideration of issues and articulation of positions in an effort 
to establish consensus positions on issues arising within the tribal-state 
interface.  It remains to be seen whether the recently initiated Choctaw-
Chickasaw Regional Water Plan51 will be able to further build in this 
direction, notwithstanding the advent of state-tribal water litigation in 
Oklahoma.52 
Let us now leave Oklahoma for California (as so many did generations 
ago), and consider the express declaration of the California Department of 
Water Resources (Department) to use its water planning process to seek “to 
deepen and expand the relationships between State agencies and California 
Native American Tribes . . . and thereby improve the overall quality and 
comprehensiveness of the plan.”53  Most notably, the Department has—
building on its prior outreach and state-tribal consultation efforts—
established the Water Plan Tribal Advisory Committee, an 
intergovernmental body meant to “ensure integration of tribal input into 
California Water Plan Update 2013 . . . , begin addressing the complex 
water issues facing California Native American Tribes, and improve 
communication and collaboration between California Native American 
Tribes and the California Water Plan.”54 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See, e.g., BARNEY AUSTIN ET AL., REGIONAL WATER PLANNING BY THE CHICKASAW AND 
CHOCTAW TRIBAL NATIONS (2011) (abstract), available at http://www.awra.org/ 
Summer2011/doc/abs/Austin%20abs%2014-rBNA.pdf; CHICKASAW NATION & CHOCTAW 
NATION, WATER PLANNING:  SHARED RESOURCES, SHARED FUTURE (2011), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/choctaw-msldigital/assets/709/Water_Planning_Shared_Resources_ 
original.pdf; Wayne Greene, Corps of Engineers, Two Tribes to Study Water Issues Together, 
TULSA WORLD (Dec. 15, 2011, 5:15:10 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx? 
subjectid=11&articleid=20111215_16_A8_TheCho667798. 
 52. See Complaint, Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin, No. 11-927-C (W.D. Okla. Aug. 18, 
2011); Petition, Ass’n for the Prot. of Okla. Water v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., No. CJ-2012-
1069 (Okla. Cnty. Okla. Feb. 21, 2012); Okla. Water Res. Bd. v. United States, No. 110,375 
(Okla. filed Feb. 10, 2012). 
 53. Cal. Native American Tribal Engagement in the California Water Plan Update 
2013 – Tribal Engagement Plan 1 (Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://www.waterplan.water. 
ca.gov/docs/tribal_engagement/cwpu2013_Tribal_Engagement_Plan_final_11-08%2010_ 
.pdf.  
 54. Water Plan Tribal Advisory Committee Group Charter 1 (Aug. 6, 2011) (emphasis 
omitted), available at http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/docs/tac/Final_TribalACCharter. 
pdf. 
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The plain spoken ambition and optimism of the California approach is 
strides beyond the defensive position staked out by the 1975 and 1980 
Oklahoma water plans and goes even further than the aspirational 
recommendations of the latest iteration of the Oklahoma water plan.  Again, 
leaving aside for now any assessment of practical impactits approach has 
had with respect to state-tribal relations and the avoidance of water conflict, 
California has at least shown that the tool is available and, as a matter of 
policy, has a desirable utility.  As more and more water planning exercises 
explore the issues that arise within the tribal-state interface, we will have an 
increasing body of empirical evidence on which to base practical 
assessments of utility. 
V. Conclusion 
Water law is built on conflict.  The fight erupts, and we go to court or a 
conference room to hammer out positions and find out what the rules will 
abide.  But most often, those conflicts do not end once a court declares a 
“winner” or the parties cut a deal, and that is largely so because water 
management decisions do not only have community-wide impacts; they 
have broad intercommunity impacts.  Accordingly, resolution of water 
resource conflicts, particularly those that arise from the complex issues 
found at the tribal-state interface, take a much more comprehensive and 
creative effort, something through which the affected parties can determine 
not only what the law says, but also what science, political will, and 
common sense suggest is obtainable and workable.  
Over the past century, we have relied primarily on litigation to address 
the questions that arise from that interface zone, and for the past thirty-five 
years, we have attempted to pursue comprehensive negotiations wherever 
possible.  As the science, technology, and legal systems on which we rely 
for water management grow more complex, we are increasingly reliant on 
comprehensive water planning to anticipate and minimize future 
challenges.  Perhaps those water planning efforts can provide us another 
tool for trying to resolve—or better manage—the remaining questions. 
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